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BUSINESS AS USUAL: JUVENILE JUSTICE
DURING THE 1980s
IRA M. SCHWARTZ*
MARTHA WADE STEKETEE**
JEFFREY A. Burrs***

INTRODUCTION'

The juvenile justice system during the 1980s failed to live
up to the goals it set for itself during the 1960s and 1970s. The
U.S. Congress, Presidential commissions and numerous standard-setting bodies determined during the 1970s that the most
effective means of protecting the public safety and reducing the
impact ofjuvenile crime would involve prevention and community-based intervention, with minimal institutionalization. The
overwhelming consensus was to reserve training schools and
other secure facilities for chronic or violent offenders. Very
young and less serious offenders were to be supervised in noninstitutional and community-based programs.
Despite this consensus, national rates ofjuvenile incarceration remained virtually unchanged during the past decade. By
the end of the 1980s, in fact, many states used incarceration
more and often for less serious offenders. The glaring
problems of gang violence, drug abuse, and automatic weapons
captured the headlines, yet the nation as a whole was not
experiencing a juvenile crime wave. The inner-cities became
more isolated and more neglected during the 1980s, and a
Director, Center for the Study of Youth Policy at the University of
Michigan and Professor, University of Michigan School of Social Work. He
was the Administrator of the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention during the Carter Administration.
0* Researcher, Center for the Study of Youth Policy, a social worker
and a doctoral student at the University of Michigan School of Social Work.
***
Researcher, Center for the Study of Youth Policy, a social worker
and a doctoral candidate at the University of Michigan School of Social Work.
1. Some of the data utilized in this article were made available by the

Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. Data for the
Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility Census, 1977, 1982-83 and
1986-87, were originally collected by the United States Department of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics and Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention. Neither the collector of the original data nor the
Consortium bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretations
presented here.
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highly organized criminal subculture emerged in response to
the lucrative cocaine market. In many jurisdictions, the
urgency of these problems was used to justify the abandonment
of community-based corrections programs. The political will
to provide prevention and early treatment seemed to erode.
PLANS FOR REFORM

The origins of American practices in youth detention and
corrections can be traced to the "houses of refuge" of the mid1800s and the child saver movement which emerged in the U.S.
toward the end of the nineteenth century.' Public outrage over
the incarceration of young people in adult jails and prisons
gave rise to the belief that juveniles should be placed in separate institutions that emphasize rehabilitation and reform. 3
The houses of refuge, forerunners of contemporary juvenile
training schools, "promised judges, juries, police, and disgusted or overwhelmed parents an alternative to committing
children to local jails or prisons." 4 Pre-adjudication detention
centers were developed much later, following the birth of the
juvenile court. Many of these centers served dependent and
neglected children as well as those accused of crimes.
These juvenile institutions largely escaped public scrutiny
until the 1960s and 1970s when class action lawsuits began to
reveal abusive practices and intolerable conditions of confinement in training schools.5 Influential books further documented the plight of children in these facilities.6 A five-year
examination of the juvenile justice system by the United States
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee to investigate Juvenile Delinquency resulted in the enactment of the landmark Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. 7 A number of
2.

See generally Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22

STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1188-1221 (1970).
3.

See S. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT 57-62

(1977).
4. Id.at 24.
5. See, e.g.,
Harris v. Bell, 402 F. Supp. 469
Boys' Training School v. Affieck, 346 F. Supp.
New York State Dept. of Soc. Services, 322 F.
Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex.

(W.D. Mo. 1975); Inmates of

1354 (D.R.I. 1972); Lollis v.
Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
1974); Nelson v. Heyne, 355

F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972) aff'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 976 (1974); Pena v. New York State Department of Social Services,
322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
6.
K. WOODEN, WEEPING IN THE PLAYTIME OF OTHERS: AMERICA'S
INCARCERATED CHILDREN (1976); H. JAMES, CHILDREN IN TROUBLE: A
NATIONAL SCANDAL (1970).

7. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L.
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presidentially-appointed commissions and national professional standard-setting organizations also issued reports and
promulgated various sets of standards designed to upgrade the
juvenile justice system.
The impact of these developments was felt throughout the
juvenile justice system. One outcome was a major reconceptualization of the role and purpose of pre- and post-adjudication
incarceration ofjuveniles. A consensus of professional opinion
emerged that pre-adjudication detention should be reserved
for youths who (1). present a clear and substantial threat to the
community, or (2) would likely abscond or fail to appear in
court if released on their own recognizance or under some
form of community-based supervision. Standards published in
1980 by the National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention (NACJJDP) recommended that:
Juveniles subject to the jurisdiction of the family court
over delinquency should not be detained in a secure facility unless:
a. They are fugitives from another jurisdiction;
b. They request protection in writing in circumstances that present an immediate threat of serious physical injury;
c. They are charged with murder in the first or second degree;
d. They are charged with a serious property crime
or a crime of violence other than first or second
.degree murder which if committed by an adult
would be a felony, and
i. They are already detained or on conditional
release in connection with another delinquency proceeding;
ii. They have a demonstrable recent record of
willful failures to appear at family court
proceedings;
iii. They have a demonstrable recent record of
violent conduct resulting in physical injury
to others; or
iv. They have (a) demonstrable recent record
of adjudications for serious property
offenses; and
v. There is no less restrictive alternative that
will reduce risk of flight, or of serious harm
No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C., beginning at § 5601).
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to property or to 8the physical safety of the
juvenile or others.
A consensus also held that training schools should be
reserved for serious violent and chronic juvenile offenders.
The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974,
for example, provided fiscal incentives for states to deinstitutionalize status offenders (runaways, school truants, youths in
conflict with their parents, etc.),' to eliminate the jailing of
juveniles in adult facilities,' 0 and to develop community-based
alternatives for non-violent and non-chronic delinquent
youths," as defined by the statute. 2 The authors of the Act
recognized that training schools were an important part of the
continuum of services in youth corrections, but they believed
that these institutions should be used for the incarceration of
violent and chronic juvenile law violators.'
The juvenile justice standards promulgated by the Institute for Judicial Administration/American Bar Association recommended that "[in choosing among statutorily permissible
options, the court should employ the least restrictive category
and duration of disposition that is appropriate to the seriousness of the offense, as modified by the degree of culpability
indicated by the circumstances of the particular case, and by
the age and prior record of the juvenile."' 4 These standards
stated a clear preference to maintain a juvenile at home whenever possible. "Removal from home is the most severe disposition authorized for adjudicated juveniles. As such, it should be
reserved for the most serious or repetitive offenses, and rarely,
if ever, used for younger juveniles."'"
The IJA/ABA standards also encouraged state and local
youth corrections agencies to develop alternatives to institutions that could be used as dispositional options by the juvenile
courts. 16 In a similar vein, the NACJJDP standards recommended that training schools be used as a dispositional "last
8. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMrIrEE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STANDARDS 297 (1980) [hereinafter STANDARDS].

9. See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12)(A).
10. Id. § 5633(a)(14).

11.

Id. § 5633(a)(12)(B).

12.
13.

I

§ 5603(1).
Ford Administration Stifles Juvenile Justice Program: Hearings Before the

Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Committee on the

Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 4 (1975).
14. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
& AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSmONS 34 (1980).

15.

Id. at 62.

16.

INSTITUTE

OF

JUDICIAL

ADMINISTRATION

&

AMERICAN

BAR

BAR
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resort. '"7 These standards encouraged courts to select the
"least restrictive" dispositional option "consistent with the
seriousness of the offense, the juvenile's role in that offense,
and the juvenile's age and prior record."'"
In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals issued a report recommending
that states adopt youth correctional policies similar to those
then being implemented in Massachusetts.' 9 Massachusetts
restricts the use of secure institutional treatment to cases in
'which a youth needs to be confined for purposes of public protection and cannot be managed in a less secure setting without
compromising public safety.2 °
By the late 1970s, it seemed that a major shift in juvenile
justice policy was in the offing. There was growing support for
removing non-chronic and non-violent juveniles from detention centers and training schools by expanding the diversity
and availability of community-based options. Increasing numbers of state administrators and policymakers were becoming
aware of the need for a range of sanctions and services in youth
corrections. From all indications, the 1980s promised to be a
decade of reform in juvenile justice.
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE ENVIRONMENT OF THE

1980s

The best available evidence now suggests that there was
little change during the 1980s in the nation's youth detention
and correctional policies. In fact, some states actually
regressed, becoming more punitive and more institutionally
oriented. In part, this mirrored developments in adult corrections and criminal justice as a whole: both the prison population and the incarceration rate reached all-time highs during
the 1980s. 2 I According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the
number of Americans under some type of correctional supervision increased by 30% between 1983 and 1986.2 The Bureau
ASSOCIATION,

STANDARDS

RELATING TO CORRECTIONS ADMINISTRATION

159

(1980).
17.
18.
19.

STANDARDS, supra note

8, at 377 (1980).

Id. at 297.
NAT'L ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND

GOALS, A NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE CRIME (1973).
20. See generally B. KRISBERG, J. AUSTIN & P. STEELE, UNLOCKING
JUVENILE CORRECTIONS: EVALUATING THE MASSACHUSETTS DIVISION OF YoUtH
SERVICES (1989).
21. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME
AND JUSTICE

22.

104 (2d ed. 1988).

N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1987, at A21, col. 4.
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of the Census reported that the number of corrections employees at local, state and federal levels grew by 10% in 1987 alone,
making corrections the fastest growing sector of government
employment.23
It is disturbing to find that the juvenile system followed the
direction' set by adult corrections. Juvenile justice policy during the 1980s became more concerned with social control and
punishment than with its historic mission of prevention and
rehabilitation. Besieged by political pressure to do something
about juvenile crime, elected public officials responded by
enacting more punitive measures. In many jurisdictions, they
adopted the cynical, throw-away-the-key attitude that sometimes characterizes the adult correctional system. As is frequently the case with criminal justice issues, rising public
attention to juvenile crime resulted in actions which were
highly visible though not necessarily effective.
Policymakers in every level of government know that it is
popular -to call for a "tough" response to crime. Unless the
political environment allows public officials to say otherwise,
being tough is inevitably translated as increased reliance upon
incarceration, longer sentences, and prosecuting more
juveniles in the adult criminal courts. Even though popular
perceptions of rising juvenile crime rates have been contradicted frequently by official statistics which show stable, or even
declining rates, 24 and despite the fact that juvenile incarceration rates seem to vary more by political boundaries than by the
incidence of crime,2 5 the juvenile justice system inevitably
responds to outside pressure by increasing the use of
incarceration.
Elected officials who advocate tougher sentencing laws and
more punitive approaches toward juvenile law violators often
believe they are responding to the demands of the public, particularly their own constituents. Surveys, however, indicate
that the public has a distorted picture of the juvenile crime
problem. A national public opinion survey conducted in 1982
revealed that 87% of the respondents believed that serious
juvenile crime was increasing at an alarming rate.2" Yet
23. Government Workers at Record 17Million, L.A. Times, Apr. 21, 1989, at
2, col. 4.
24. See generally Galvin & Polk,JuvenileJustice: Time for New Direction?, 29
CRIME & DELINQ. 325 (1983); Cook & Laub, The (Surprising) Stability of Youth
Crime Rates, 2 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 265 (1986).
25. See generally Krisberg, Litsky & Schwartz, Youth in Confinement: Justice
by Geography, 21J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ.. 153 (1984).
26. I. SCHWARTZ, (IN)JusTIcE FOR JUVENILES 26 (1989).
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national arrest rates for Part I offenses by juveniles were relatively stable between 1975 and 1987.27 A recent California survey found that more than 80% of adults in that state believed
that the rate of juvenile crime had been increasing during the
1980s. 2 s In reality, the total juvenile arrest rate had fallen by
8.1% between 1981 and 1986, while the rate for violent felonies fell 21.4%.29

The results from the California survey are particularly
interesting because they raise questions about whether the
-actions of politicians really reflect the thinking of the electorate. The California respondents expressed "a strong preference for sentencing juveniles to specialized treatment and
counseling programs in lieu of incarceration in state correctional facilities, even for repeat serious offenders." s° They
expressed only moderate support for spending tax dollars to
relieve overcrowding in California's youth correction facilities
and "strong support for the proposition that juvenile offenders
should be separated from adults in confinement, and for ajuvenile sentencing scheme different from that of adults. '"
There remains among the public a general consensus that
juvenile offenders should be treated. specially by the criminal
justice system. We are still likely to attribute juvenile crime to
frustrated economic opportunity and unemployment; we
expect the juvenile court to rehabilitate rather than simply to
punish; and we expect minor offenses to be handled outside of
the juvenile justice system-preferably by community agencies.3 2 The strain between these long-held values and the popularity of hard-line, get-tough rhetoric produces acute
demands upon the agencies comprising the juvenile justice system. Juvenile courts are derided for being too lenient onjuvenile offenders, but simultaneously criticized for exacerbating
the problems of troubled youths by breaking up families and
placing young offenders in correctional institutions that do not
"correct."
27.

Idat 31;

STEKETEE, WILLIS

&

SCHWARTZ, JUVENILE JUSTICE TRENDS:

1977-1987 17 (1989).
28.
29.
30.
31.

Steinhart, California Opinion Poll. Public Attitudes on Youth Crime,
& DELINQ. Focus, Dec. 1988, at 7.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 1.

32.

Galvin & Polk, supra note 24, at 330.

NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME
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JUVENILE CORRECTIONS AND DETENTION

Apparently in response to these pressures, many states
increased their rates of juvenile institutionalization during the
1980s; others at least maintained their rates of confinement. In
very few states, however, did significant changes or reform
result from the federal policies, class action lawsuits, and tightened professional standards of the 1970s and early 1980s.
Table 1, for example, indicates that national rates of admissions to detention centers were slightly higher in 1986 than in
1977. According to these data from the federal government's
Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility Census, 3 the total
admission rate to public detention centers declined from 1,681
admissions per 100,000 eligible youth population in 1977, to
1,488 per 100,000 in 1982. At the time of most recent available census (1986-87), the rate had climbed back to nearly
1,800 admissions per 100,000.
In addition, there was a large increase in the rates of commitment to these facilities. Although not designed or recommended for the housing of committed youths, admissions of
committed juveniles to detention centers increased from 16 to
96 per 100,000 between 1977 and 1986-a surge of 600%.
Such an increase underscores the growing concern that detention facilities are used inappropriately by the
courts as a dispo4
sitional option for adjudicated juveniles.3
Table 2 demonstrates that training school admission rates
were also relatively unchanged between 1977 and 1986. As
was the case with detention centers, the total rate of admissions
to training schools declined from 227 to 205 per 100,000
between 1977 and 1982, but grew to 236 by 1986. This table
shows that admissions for female juveniles increased much less
between 1982 and 1986. Male admissions, on the other hand,
climbed by 17% during that period-from 345 to 403 per
100,000 eligible youth population. The rates for commitment
33. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility

Census,
Michigan:

1977 and

1982-83

[computer files].

ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor,

Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research

[producer and distributor]. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Detention and Correctional
Facility Census, 1986-87: Public Facilities (computer file]. Washington,

D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1988
[producer]. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Inter-university Consortium for Political
and Social Research, 1988 (distributor].

34. See generally Schwartz, Fishman, Hatfield, Krisberg & Eisikovits,
Juvenile Detention: The Hidden Closets Revisited, 4 JUsT. Q. 219 (1987).
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TABLE 1

U.S. PUBLIC DETENTION CENTERS ADMISSIONS AND

100,000

RATES PER

ELIGIBLE YOUTHS BY

STATUS 1977, 1982 AND 1986

#

1977
Rate per
100,000

#

1982
Rate per
100,000

#

1986
Rate per
100,000

Committed Youths
Males
Females
Total

3,806
998
4,804

26
7
16

16,940
3,444
20,384

120
25
74

21,039
3,844
24,883

159
30
96

Detained Youths
Males
Females
Total

371,694
112,738
484,432

2,502
790
1,663

308,457
81,717
390,174

2,190
604
1,414

353,411
89,329
442,740

2,664
702
1,703

375,728
113,966
489,694

2,530
798
1,681

325,461
85,227
410,688

2,311
630
1,488

374,461
93,207
467,668

2,823
732
1,799

All Youths
Males
Females
Total

Notes:
I. Rates are based on the numbers of youths aged 10 through the age of maximum
original juvenile court jurisdiction for each state and the District of Columbia.
2. Committed status youths are those placed following adjudication. Detained
youths are pending adjudication or awaiting formal court disposition or placement.
Voluntary status admissions (self-admits or referrals through agencies other than the
juvenile court) are included in the "all youths" lines above.
Sources: Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility Census, 1977, 1982-83 and
1986-87. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-25,
published and unpublished data.

admissions only (i.e.,

excluding detainees) were essentially.

stable.
A substantial proportion of the juveniles confined in
detention centers and training schools were minor and petty
law violators and, to a lesser extent, status offenders. Table 3
shows the number of juveniles confined in public detention
centers on the day of the most recently published facility census (February 2, 1987), as well as the offenses charged against
these youths. This table reveals that only 41 7 of the detained
youths were accused of committing a Part I offense (either violent or property). Approximately 6% of the youths had been

detained for a status offense, while more than half were
charged with less serious Part II crimes such as shoplifting,
drug offenses, vandalism and receiving stolen property. The
data also reveal significant differences by gender. Just 22% of
detained females were accused of a Part I offense.
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TABLE 2
U.S. PUBLIC TRAINING SCHOOLS ADMISSIONS AND
RATES PER 100,000 ELIGIBLE YOUTHS BY
STATUS 1977, 1982 AND 1986

#

100,000

1986
Rate per

1982
Rate per

1977
Rate per

#

100.000

#

100,000

Committed Youths
Males
Females
Total

48,903
7,417
56,320

329
52
193

41,888
6,448
48,336

297
48
175

43,988
6,091
50,079

332
48
193

Detained Youths
Males
Females
Total

7,494
2,201
9,695

50
15
33

6.746
1,481
8,227

48
11
30

9,478
1,842
11,320

71
14
44

56,427
9,671
66,098

380
68
227

48,639
7,929
56,568

345
59
205

53,466
7,933
61,399

403
62
236

All Youths
Males
Females
Total

Notes:
1. Rates are based on the numbers of youths aged 10 through the age of maximum
original juvenile court jurisdiction for each state and the District of Columbia.
2. Committed status youths are those placed following adjudication. Detained
youths are pending adjudication or awaiting formal court disposition or placement.
Voluntary status admissions (self-admits or referrals through agencies other than the
juvenile court) are included in the "all youths" lines above.
Sources: Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility Census, 1977, 1982-83 and
1986-87. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Current Population Reports, Series P-25,
published and unpublished data.

Table 4 depicts the offenses charged against youths who
were confined in public training schools at the time of the most
recent census. Slightly more than half (53.6%) of these
juveniles were accused of serious offenses. One-fifth had been
adjudicated for a Part I violent crime, while one-third were
charged with a serious property offense such as burglary or
auto theft. Again, there were significant differences by gender,
with two-thirds of the females being incarcerated for less serious (non-Part I) crimes.
Table 5 provides the percentage in each state of confined
youths that committed a Part I offense. As reported by administrators in the 1986-87 census, these percentages vary substantially from state to state. State public training school facilities
in Wisconsin, Washington, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania
reported that more than 70% of their youth populations had
been charged with Part I offenses. In other states, however, the
proportion of Part I offenders can be quite low, suggesting that
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TABLE 3
U.S. PUBLIC DETENTION CENTERS ONE DAY CouNTs
BY OFFENSE AND GENDER 1987

MALES
# %

FEMALES
#
%

#

TOTAL
5

Part I: Violent

1,691

13.5%

116

4.9%

1,807

12.1%

Part 1: Property

3,959

31.6%

409

17.4%

4,368

29.3%

Part I!

6,474

51.6%

1,415

60.0%

7.889

53.0%

Status

416

3.3%

417

17.7%

833

5.6%

Totals

12,540

.100.0%

2,357

100.0%

14,897

100.0%

Notes:
1. Respondent administrators were asked to indicate the number of committed and
detained juvenile and status offenders on the census date February 2, 1987. They were
directed to report the most serious offense if records reflect several offenses.
2. Offense categories are collapsed here as presented in the Survey:
Part I Violent: Murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and
aggravated assault.
Part I Property: Burglary, arson, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft.
Part II: All offenses not Part I or Status.
Status: Offense which "would not be considered a crime if committed by an adult"
Source: Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility Census, 1986-87.

many non-serious offenders were being confined in correctional institutions. For example, Maine, Montana, North and
South Dakota, Virginia and Kentucky all reported that 30% or
less of the youths confined in their training schools committed
serious, Part I offenses."3
State Studies
The federally-administered Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility Census, which provided most of the data
presented above, is a useful and internally consistent source of
data on the national juvenile corrections population. It is espe-

cially valuable as a device for tracking changes in the rates of
facility admissions and periodic one-day counts. It cannot,
however, be taken as a completely reliable measure of the
severity of offenses charged against the incarcerated juvenile
population.
35. These tables describe only those youths for whom offenses were
reported. Vermont did not have a public training school; Wyoming had a
large number of cases in which no offense was reported. Overall, offenses
were reported for more than 95% of youths present in public training schools

on the census date.
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U.S. PUBLIC TRAINING SCHOOLS ONE DAY COUNTS
BY OFFENSE AND GENDER
MALES

#

1987

FEMALES

%

#

TOTAL

%70

Part I: Violent

4,850

21.1%

354

12.8%

5,204

Part I: Property

8,044

35.0%

565

20.5%

8,609

33.4%

Part II

9,857

42.8%

1,538

55.8%

11,395

44.2%

Status

260

1.1%

300

10.9%

560

2.2%

Totals

23,011

100.0%

2,757

100.0%

25,768

100.0%

20.2%

Notes:
1. Respondent administrators were asked to indicate the numbers and types of
committed and detained juvenile and status offenders on the census date February 2,
1987. They were directed to report the most serious offense if records reflect several
offenses.
2. Offense categories are collapsed here as presented in the Survey:
Part I Violent: Murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and
aggravated assault.
Part I Property: Burglary, arson, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft.
Part II: All offenses not Part I or Status.
Status: Offense which "would not be considered a crime if committed by an adult"
Source: Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility Census, 1986-87.

The Census, which is better known as the Children in Custody series, relies upon questionnaires filled out by administrators. Each administrator answers a number of questions about
the youths being held in his or her facility. The questionnaire
asks the administrators to report the most serious offenses
charged against the youths who were in custody on the census
date. The youths' case records or legal files are not reviewed in
detail by anyone outside of the facilities. The most accurate
characterization of the offenses committed by incarcerated
juveniles would require reviews of the documents typically
found in delinquency case records.
Recently, a number of states conducted risk assessment
studies that offer an additional source of information about
juvenile corrections populations. Independent researchers
examined institutional case records in the states and evaluated
the recentness, severity, and frequency of delinquent behavior
among incarcerated juvenile offenders. Through these studies,
the offender population of each juvenile correctional system
was segmented into relatively low-risk and relatively high-risk
groups so that policymakers and youth correction officials
could make informed decisions about how the system's limited
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resources were being allocated. These studies confirmed that a
relatively large proportion of the juveniles confined in state
training schools are not serious or chronic offenders. Furthermore, the studies suggest that the Facility Census may actually
underestimate the extent to which non-serious offenders are
incarcerated in training schools.
TABLE 5
U.S. PUBLIC DETENTION CENTERS AND TRAINING

SCHOOLS PERCENT JUVENILES
INCARCERATED FOR PART I
OFFENSES By STATE AND TOTAL

1987

% Detention Center
Population Incarcerated
for Part I Offense

% Training School
Population Incarcerated
for Part I Offense

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California

46.9%
36.1%
26.2%
73.3%
41.0%

43.4%
47.4%
61.1%
63.9%
45.9%

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D.C.
Florida

41.3%
60.0%
68.2%
20.6%
45.6%

68.6%
48.9%
36.8%
45.1%
53.4%

Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana

47.9%
15.7%
62.5%
44.0%
27.9%

54.1%
66.7%
69.4%
58.2%
43.5%

Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine

66.7%
47.3%
39.0%
55.1%
0.0%

39.0%

Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi

32.2%
57.8%
44.9%
36.2%
42.9%

41.4%
53.3%
66.4%
46.9%
63.9%

Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire

37.5%
0.0%
27.9%
17.1%
64.3%

38.9%
25.1%
34.8%
34.2%
73.7%

New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota

46.2%
21.8%
44.7%
43.7%
25.0%

58.1%
51.0%
68.4%
41.5%
23.1%

59.3%
30.4%
67.4%
23.8%
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Table 5 (Continued)
% Detention Center
Population Incarcerated
for Part I Offense

% Training School
Population Incarcerated
for Part I Offense

Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

29.8%
48.8%
18.1%
57.0%
0.0%

61.1%
68.0%
65.6%
70.1%
64.6%

South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah

66.7%
15.2%
49.3%
49.1%
12.6%

46.0%
27.4%
52.1%
60.7%
60.4%

Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

93.3%
43.3%
53.0%
66.7%
15.6%
0.0%

0.0%
27.4%
71.5%
60.4%
84.7%
2.2%

TOTAL U.S.

4 1.5%

53.6%

Notes:
1. Respondent administrators were asked to indicate the nubmer of committed and
detained juvenile and status offenders on the census date Februray 2, 1987.
Respondents indicate the most serious offense if record of several offenses.
2. These data reflect only those youth for whom offenses were reported. For
detention centers there were 202 females (or 7.9% of total females), 1,047 males (or
7.7% of total males) and 1,249 total juveniles (or 7.7% of total juveniles) for whom
offenses were not reported.
For training schools there were 202 females (or 6.8% of total females), 1,064 males
(or 4.4% of total males) and 1,266 total juveniles (or 4.7% of total juveniles) for whom
offenses were not reported.
3. Part I offenses include both Part I Property (burglary, arson, larceny-theft, and
motor vehicle theft) and Part I Violent (murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible
rape, robbery and aggravated assault).
Source: Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility Census, 1986-87.

For example, a study of the Alabama youth correction system revealed that nearly three-quarters (74%) of the state's
juvenile inmates were committed for status offenses, violations
of probation, misdemeanors, or minor felonies (primarily third
degree burglary and second degree theft). Most of the youths
committed for minor offenses had only minor prior offenses as
well. The researchers who conducted the study estimated that
Alabama's juvenile training school population could be
reduced by 50 to 55%o without a significant risk to the public
safety.3 6 Similar studies in Delaware, Rhode Island, and Mississippi estimated that between 40 and 70% of the juveniles being
36.
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held in secure facilities were neither violent nor chronic offenders, and could most likely be managed safely in the
community.37
Juveniles in Jails
Despite amendments to the Juvenile Justice Act mandating
the removal of youths from adult jails,3 8 young people still are
being held in adult correctional facilities. Censuses and sample
surveys of jails throughout the 1980s by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics indicated that juveniles were confined in these facilities. The 1983 census found 1,736 youths under 18 being held
in adult jails on June 30, 1983, with similar numbers reported
for both 1985 and 1986. 3 ' Though the Bureau ofJustice Statistics indicates that such numbers must be interpreted with caution as they comprise fewer than 1
of the incarcerated
populations on these dates,40 it remains true that youths continue to be incarcerated in facilities designed for adults, contrary to federal law.
POLICY FOR THE 1990s

Despite the clear intent of the amended Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 and the standards and
goals advocated by the Institute for Judicial Administration/
American Bar Association, and the National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, there were
few changes in the rate of juvenile incarceration during the
1980s. Some youths were still being held in adultjails, and relatively minor and non-serious offenders were being placed in
secure facilities, including a number of status offenders. It was
apparent by the end of the decade that the reforms envisioned
by federal policymakers had not materialized. Yet, innovative
policymakers and juvenile justice professionals in some states
were beginning to re-emphasize community-based youth corrections. Prompted at least in part by revenue constraints and
37.

See P.
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13 (1987); P.

DEMURO

&J. BUTrrs,

REPORT TO THE

JUVENILE JUSTICE TASK FORCE: RHODE ISLAND'S JUVENILE JusTICE SYSTEMMORE OF THE SAME .. . OR AN OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORM? 4 (1988);J. BUTrrs
& P. DEMURO, POPULATION PROFILE AND RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY: MISSISSIPPI
DEPARTMENT OF YOuTH SERVICES 19 (1989).

38. Juvenile Justice Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-509, 94 Stat.
2750, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(14)).
39. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1989).
40. Id.
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class action lawsuits, 4 ' several states had reduced their training
school populations and were -exploring new correctional
approaches that rely on community supervision while reserving
secure placement for chronic and violent youthful offenders."
Massachusetts and Utah, for example, are widely recognized for their reliance on community-based programs and
limited use of confinement for committed youths. Relatively
few juveniles in these two states are prosecuted in the adult
criminal courts and sentenced to adult prisons. Their youth
corrections systems have been studied by the National Council
on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD). Recently, NCCD concluded that "Utah's policy of community-based corrections did
not worsen public safety." 43 The NCCD researchers observed
that "the imposition of appropriate community-based controls
on highly active serious and chronic juvenile offenders is
consistent with public protection goals."" The study also
noted that managing these youthful offenders in the community had saved Utah taxpayers more than $30 million in capital
costs and approximately $10 million annually in operating
expenditures.4 5
NCCD's evaluation of the youth corrections system in Massachusetts found that youths placed in the custody of the state
committed far fewer offenses after leaving state care and that
"there was a slight tendency over time to commit less serious
crimes." 46 The NCCD study also compared the recidivism
rates of youths in the Massachusetts system with those in the
states of Pennsylvania, Utah, Florida, Texas, Illinois, Wisconsin, and California. The results showed that the youths in the
Massachusetts system "had equivalent, and in some instances
lower recidivism rates than youths from [the] other states."'47
Citing Utah's experience with community-based corrections,
the NCCD researchers believed that expanding the use of
secure confinement in Massachusetts would involve large pub41. See cases cited supra note 5.
42. See generally Blackmore, Brown & Krisberg, Juvenile Justice Reform:
The Bellwether States (1988); Butts, Youth Corrections in Maryland: The Dawningof
a New Era, in YOUTH CORRECTION REFORM: THE MARYLAND AND FLORIDA

EXPERIENCE (Ctr. for the Study of Youth Policy ed. 1988).

43. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, THE IMPACT OF
JUVENILE COURT INTERVENTION 147 (1987).
44.

Id.

45.

Id. at 134-36.

46.

B. KRISBERG, J. AUSTIN & P. STEELE, supra note 20, at 18.

47.

Id at 25.
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lic expenditures, but 48"would not produce a noticeable reduction in youth crime."1

A recent study in Wayne County (Detroit), Michigan tested
the effectiveness of intensive community-based supervision
programs as an alternative to commitment. The study had a
randomized design and followed more than 500 cases over a
four-year period. The results showed that the recidivism of
youths placed in the intensive probation programs was no
worse than that of youths committed to the state and usually
placed in public and private training schools.4 9 Moreover, the
intensive probation programs cost about one-third as much as
commitment and incarceration. The study estimated that the
State of Michigan saved nearly $9 million in placement costs by
using community programs instead of commitment.
Policymakers and juvenile justice officials who equate
being "tough" with good policy would thus be well advised to
re-evaluate their juvenile crime control practices. Institutional
confinement is but one resource in the battle to control juvenile crime, and should be focused on serious and violent
offenders in order to permit adequate financing of quality community-based programs. This strategy, which has been implemented successfully in Massachusetts, Utah, and Maryland,' is
neither new nor radical. It is the sound, cost-effective approach
called for throughout the 1970s but never consistently implemented before being abandoned in favor of "getting tough."
CRITICAL ISSUES

The need for reforms in youth detention and correctional
practices will be studied and debated by researchers, juvenile
justice professionals, and policymakers in the years ahead.
Those involved in shaping the policies of the next decade

should consider a number of important issues in planning for
the future.
48. Id. at 33.
49. See Barton & Butts, Viable Options: Intensive Supervision Programsfor
Juvenile Delinquents, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 238, 244 (1990).
50. See generally Loughran, Juvenile Corrections: The Massachusetts
Experience, in REINVESTING YOUTH CORRECTIONS RESOURCES: A TALE OF
THREE STATES 7 (1987); Van Vleet, Rutherford & Schwartz, Reinvesting Youth
Corrections Resources in Utah, in id. at 23; Butts, supra note 42; Matheson,
Political Leadership in JuvenileJustice Reform, in YOUTH CORRECTIONS AND THE
QUIET REVOLUTION 7 (n.d.); Bangerter, Youth Corrections in Utah: A Commitment
to Excellence, in id at 17.
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Race
The U.S. is becoming an increasingly diverse nation, with
many cultures and ethnicities. This is especially true among
young people. Minorities have been disproportionately incarcerated for many years. Although blacks comprise approximately 15% of the population, they account for 38% of youths
in public juvenile correctional facilities."' In 1982, the incarceration rate in public juvenile correctional facilities was four
times greater for black male juveniles than for white males,
while black females were incarcerated at over twice the rate of
white females in similar public facilities.5 2 Addressing the disproportionate rate of minority incarceration in the juvenile justice system may first require comprehensive social and
economic reforms, but this issue should hold center stage in
the future.
Gender
Researchers during the 1970s documented the long-standing differential treatment of girls by the juvenile justice system."3 Their research indicated that girls were more likely to
be incarcerated for a less serious offense than their male counterparts, and that they were often confined for longer periods
of time than boys who had committed serious offenses. Unfortunately, despite some decline in the rates of female incarceration, the differential treatment of female juveniles continues to
be a problem. Girls are still being confined for less serious
offenses than are boys, and programs designed especially for
female offenders are rare. Juvenile justice professionals and
elected public officials need .to make this issue a top priority
and design programs that will reduce the rate of incarceration
among girls.
Public Opinion
The distorted picture the public has about the juvenile
crime problem is particularly troublesome. It is difficult to
51. See Krisberg, Schwartz, Fishman, Eisikovits, & Guttman, The
Incarcerationof Minority Youth, 33 CRIME & DELtNo. 173, 179 (1987).
52. Id. at 184-85.
53. See, e.g., Kratcoski, Differential Treatment of Delinquent Boys and Girls in
Juvenile Court, 53 CHILD WELFARE 16 (1972); Sarri, Juvenile Law: How it
Penalizes Females, in THE FEMALE OFFENDER 67 (L. Crites ed. 1976);

Schlossman & Wallach, The Crime of Precocious Sexuality: Female. Juvenile
Delinquency in the Progressive Era, 48 HARV. ED. REV. 65 (1978); Chesney-Lind,
Judicial Paternalismand the Female Status Offender. Training Women to Know Their
Place, 23 CRIME & DELIN.
121 (1977).
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imagine how rational juvenile crime control policies can be
developed and maintained when most citizens are ill-informed
on the issue and elected officials blatantly exploit this. Every
effort must be made to inform and educate the public about the
nature and scope of the juvenile crime problem so that sound
decisions can be made. The experiences of the 1988 presidential campaign should serve as a stern reminder of the social fric-

tion surrounding correctional policy and the extent to which
ignorance and fear have been allowed to affect public debate."
The Federal Role
There is no escaping the need for federal leadership in
juvenile justice policy. In the future, federal administrators
should take the lead in acquainting state and local governments
with the most effective and innovative juvenile justice practices.
New energy should be focused on developing the non-institutional alternatives called for in the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 and its amendments. In
addition, federal leaders should be spearheading a national
effort to prevent crime, not merely punish the small proportion
of offenders who are actually caught and convicted. The U.S.
Congress declared in 1974 that it would provide the necessary
resources, leadership and coordination to "develop and implement effective methods of preventing and reducing juvenile
delinquency, including methods with a special focus on maintaining and strengthening the family unit so that juveniles may
be retained in their homes." 5 5 Community-based prevention is
fundamental to alleviating the problems of delinquency and its
common antecedents: family disruption, school failure and
drug abuse. Now, as fifteen years ago, effective communitybased prevention should be a national priority.
CONCLUSION

A number of forward-thinking state and local governments
have shown that, given the availability of well-designed and
well-managed programs, many juvenile offenders can be maintained in the community without jeopardizing the public safety.
Yet, most of the nation has continued to believe that juvenile
crime is worsening and that an increasingly punitive and
expensive juvenile corrections system is the best solution to the
crime problem. This approach is wasteful at best and socially
54. See generally, e.g., Campaign Focus on Furloughs Prompts Review of
Programs, 19 CRIM. JusT. NEWSL. I (Dec. 1, 1988).

55. 42 U.S.C. § 5602(b) (1988).
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destructive at worst. Juvenile justice policy must be redirected
during the 1990s toward a more effective and efficient use of
scarce resources. The 1980s proved to be a decade of stagnation; the next ten years must be a decade of progress.

